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In this article, I want to look again at the ideas of Raymond Williams in The Long 
Revolution (first published in 1961) - which was an inspiring statement of the political 
perspective of the early new left. It was a hopeful book, combining a belief in a 
progressive historical evolution with recognition of the continuing obstacles to 
progress. Williams’s thinking was rooted in his experience both of class and of 
culture, and the originality of his synthesis lay in his attempt to bring these 
dimensions of understanding together.  
 
He saw in the achievement of full citizenship by working people a profound challenge 
to two kinds of established class power - the power of what was originally a landed 
elite, linked with the military and the empire, and the power of modern corporate 
capitalism.1 He saw the institutions of the state, and its ‘service class’, as combining 
the interests of both these social formations. And he believed that aristocratic and 
capitalist forms of power had long been under pressure from below, through 
movements of working people seeking their freedom from subordination, and through 
ideas which expressed their claims. He saw the ‘long revolution’ as taking place in 
three spheres. The first was economic - the development of a modern industrial 
economy had conferred real benefits on the majority of people, in terms of economic 
prosperity, security, dignity and power. The second was political. Against the grain of 
liberal political theory, Williams saw the rise of democracy as primarily the practical 
achievement of the working-class movement. He thus linked the struggle for 
democratisation to a profound change in the balance of power of social classes. The 
third sphere in the long revolution - and this was the most original part of the 
argument - was that of the cultural: Williams had a vision of all citizens participating 
fully in a ‘common culture’. He focused attention on the role of media technologies 
and education in the development of modern societies - most chapters in the book are 
about cultural institutions and forms.  
 
A highly original chapter on creativity developed the conception of human nature on 
which his argument depends. This chapter drew on the tradition of cultural criticism 
he had explored in his previous book Culture and Society, and on his readings in 
contemporary psychology and biology. He set out his view of a good society as one 
that would be dedicated to shared learning in all its institutions and practices. The 
Long Revolution moved beyond the state-focused conceptions of planning that had 
dominated the conceptions of thought and action of both the Labour Party and the 
Communist Party, to develop an organic perspective of change which looked beyond 
governments. He sought to articulate a politics of alternative values, rooted in the 
                                            
1
 Incidentally, his conceptualisation of British society as organised around these three contending class 
formations was unexceptional in the 1960s, as indeed it had been, from all points of the ideological 
compass, for 150 years. Harold Wilson was shortly to fight the 1964 election as a campaign against the 
residues of aristocratic power, represented by the former Lord Home. It was in this period of the early 
1960s that the contemporary debate about ‘modernisation’ began.  
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emergent aspirations and experiences of social agents and collectivities. This 
remained the dominant theme of his later political writing.  
 
Towards 2000 
Williams returned to the analysis of The Long Revolution in Towards 2000, which 
was published in 1983. He included in this book most of the final chapter of the 
earlier volume, reappraising its argument in the light of what had happened in the 
intervening decades. Its last chapter was called ‘Resources for a Journey of Hope’, 
although Williams anticipated a quarter century of setbacks and acknowledged that 
change in a positive direction was bound to be slow, contested, and confusing. That 
after all was the essential idea of a ‘long revolution’. In 1983 he saw the force and 
persistence with which capitalist institutions were committed to remaking the world. 
He named as ‘Plan X’ what we might now describe as a concerted neo-capitalist 
strategy to turn back the democratic revolution and fashion the world in terms of 
capital, individualism, and the market, and to pursue the cold war to a victorious 
conclusion. And these developments did indeed take place in the following years. He 
recognised in Towards 2000 the nature and effects of de-industrialisation, the 
weakening solidarities of class, the deep democratic deficit of political institutions in 
Britain, and the development of a culture of consumption - what he called ‘mobile 
privatisation’ - as continuing obstructions to social advance. He identified as forces 
for good new movements for disarmament, for the protection of the environment, for 
the rights of women, and for an alternative culture, but noted how these oppositional 
forces tended to become isolated and marginalised within the dominant political 
system. Williams continued to argue without apology as a socialist, juxtaposing to the 
ownership of capital, and to hierarchical modes of control in most institutions, the 
idea of a democratic, self-determining way of life to which people could contribute 
freely in accordance with their capacities and needs.  
 
A weakness in Williams’s argument was his lack of attention to the immediate, and, 
as it turned out, the decisive political conjuncture of the early 1980s. He had a 
preference for thinking in the longue durée, identifying deep changes in cultural, 
economic and social forms. He was interested above all in connectedness, and in the 
impingements of a complex society and culture on lived experience. But these ways 
of thinking, and his dislike of instrumental political practices, left little space for 
thinking about the more contingent aspects of political conflicts and their sometimes 
critical outcomes.  
 
In 1983, when Towards 2000 was published, Britain was emerging from the 
exceptional crisis in social relations of the 1970s, during which the uneasy class 
compromise of the post-war welfare state collapsed in successive governmental 
failures - first of the Tories under Heath, then of Labour under Wilson and Callaghan. 
The entire governmental system, Conservative and Labour establishments alike, 
experienced these events as deeply traumatic, putting at risk, as they saw it, the 
survival of the British social order itself, which was deemed to have arrived at a state 
of ‘ungovernability’. 2 The ‘counter-revolution’ pursued by the Thatcherites, and 
continued under Blair, cannot be understood unless one sees as its shadow a dreaded 
                                            
2
 On these political dimensions, Stuart Hall’s writing in that period, from Policing the Crisis 
(1978) with Charles Critcher, John Clarke, Tony Jefferson and Brian Roberts, to the classic 
essays published in Marxism Today and later reprinted in The Hard Road to Renewal (1988) 
were more incisive.  
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state of anarchy, or even social revolution, that in their view almost happened. The 
reaction of the left to the failure of the Wilson-Callaghan government, in the 
attempted radicalisation after 1979 of the Labour Party and the trade unions under the 
leaderships of Benn and Scargill, seemed to further justify these anxieties, provoking 
the split in the Labour Party in the formation of the SDP. But in fact this 
radicalisation, weakly represented in the leadership of Michael Foot, and then rejected 
and attacked by Neil Kinnock, was easily crushed. The real earthquakes had occurred 
in the IMF Crisis of 1976, and in the Winter of Discontent of 1979, and these later 
events were aftershocks.  
 
Williams observed Labour governments fail to make much of their opportunities to 
advance ‘the long revolution’ in both the 1960s and 1970s. He saw the repeated 
absorption of elected representatives of working-class movements by the routines and 
mentalities of the ruling system, disabling the sources of democratic action, as part of 
the landscape. He recognised at an early stage the political degeneration which was 
taking place even inside the radical class forces of those years. He wrote in The Long 
Revolution of the ‘visible moral decline of the labour movement’, and later expressed 
disquiet at the terms of some of the radical militancy of the 1970s. He described a 
regression taking place in the working-class movement from a politics of alternative 
values, to one of competitive advantage.3 In Towards 2000 he charted the gathering 
strength of capitalist mentalities. But he did not recognise, except in the abstract terms 
of ‘Plan X’, the fierceness and vindictiveness of the right’s determination to settle 
accounts with the post-war class compromise of ‘consensus politics’ which it called 
‘socialism’.  
 
Williams, as a socialist, seems to have had more confidence in the stability of the 
British social system than whose who believed themselves entitled by birth and 
formation to govern it. He saw the strikes and election defeats of those years as the 
normal tensions of a capitalist democracy, while the governing establishment 
perceived them as threats to its very existence. But it turned out that the revolutionary 
force in Britain at this time emerged on the right, not the left.  
 
The full potential of this counter-revolution was not yet fully evident in 1983 when 
Towards 2000 was published. It seems probable that, without her military success in 
the Falklands War in 1982, Thatcher would have lost office in 1983 or 1984, and that 
some kind of post-war consensus could have been restored in the less inflationary 
economic conditions of the 1980s.4 The Thatcher government was seen in 1982 to be 
responsible for de-industrialisation and mass unemployment, and it was highly 
unpopular until the Falklands War came to its rescue.5 It had by then achieved few of 
                                            
3
 It was through this shift of attitudes that solidarities would soon be undermined by the Thatcherites’ 
appeal to individual self-interest, even among trade unionists. The Tories key voter targets in 1979 
were skilled workers whose wage-claims were being restrained by corporatist incomes policies; and the 
enforced sale of council houses, under the ‘right-to-buy legislation of 1981, set out to dissolve another 
source of collective identification.  
4
 The deferred costs of the Vietnam War and the surge in oil prices following the Arab-Israeli war of 
1973 contributed to the exceptional inflation of the 1970s, which amplified the social tensions of the 
time.  
5
  After the Falklands War, the popularity of the Thatcher government rose in the polls from 23% to 
33%. But  while its  unpopularity before the War was real enough, it is uncertain what the opposition 
parties - Labour,  led by Michael Foot, and the SDP, at parity with Labour  in the polls - could have 
achieved  if  Thatcher had  then been defeated.  Could some revised 'class settlement' have been 
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its decisive reforms.6 The windfall North Sea oil revenues which were in effect used 
to pay the costs of de-industrialisation and of poor relief for the unemployed would 
have been a considerable resource for a consensual government, of either party, as can 
be seen from the example of Norway. The other major nations of Western Europe 
found ways out of the crises of the late 1960s and 1970s different from Britain’s neo-
liberalism. Thatcherism has had major and lasting consequences since 1983, but this 
outcome was by no means assured before 1983.  
 
Obstacles to the long revolution  
What Raymond Williams saw as the possibility of an ultimately socialist revolution, 
evolving with difficulty from successive class settlements and compromises, has 
instead been resolved for the time being in Britain in a different way. The ‘Plan X’ 
that Williams named as a concerted strategy to enforce the dominance of capitalism, 
in fact became the programme of the Thatcher, Major and Blair governments. A 
combination of a strong and centralised state, and a particular British configuration of 
resources, made possible a neo-liberal restructuring of the social order more thorough 
than in any other nation in Western Europe. Where industrial decline had been 
deemed a national problem in the 1960s, blamed by many on the dead weight of 
aristocracy and empire, by the 1980s it was conceived as opening up new 
opportunities. Globalisation was embraced for the prospects it offered to certain 
sectors of the economy - notably the financial sector, but also retailing, tourism, and 
the ‘creative industries’ - and its costs to manufacturing were dismissed by neo-
liberals as the collateral damage of modernisation.  
 
Since 1978, manufacturing in Britain has reduced its share of Gross Domestic Product 
and employment by approximately half. In the same period, the share of the financial 
sector has doubled. (During this time manufacturing has not declined to the same 
degree in Germany, which remains a competitive industrial nation with a large trade 
surplus.) Although the dominant element of an economy is always less than its 
totality, leading-edge sectors often exercise hegemony over both the economy and the 
wider society. Just as this was the case for the Fordist mass production of household 
consumer goods and motor cars in the period from the 1930s to the 1960s, and to a 
lesser degree for the creative and fashion industries of the 1960s, so it is now for the 
financial sector. Increasing inequalities of wealth and income, and a growing 
economic disparity between London and the South East and the rest of the country, 
reflect the national decline in manufacturing and the rise of finance. So does the fall in 
trade union membership in the private sector, and the consequent weakening of 
Labour’s core vote and culture. Even so, considering Labour’s continuing dependence 
on its electorates in the Midlands and North, it is extraordinary that its numerous MPs 
from these regions have remained such feeble spectators of their regions’ loss of 
investment and employment. 7 
                                                                                                                             
constructed, less  radical than the counter-revolution that actually took place? 
 
6
 The key ones were the deregulation of the City in the ‘Big Bang’ of 1986; trade union reforms; the 
compulsory sale of council houses; privatisation of public industries; marketising reforms in the public 
sector. Only the ‘right to buy’ was fully effected in the first Thatcher term, with only cautious steps 
towards trade union reform and privatisation. Deregulation of the City led to major buy-outs by 
American banks, strengthening economic ties to the USA.  
7
 Virtually all of the major transport investments now being undertaken or considered by the Blair 
governments - Channel Tunnel extension, Crossrail, the East London Line and London Orbital 
Railway, Thameslink, and the projected Heathrow and Stansted runways - are in the London area.  
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The generation of wealth from the global trading assets - often little more than 
gambling on future values - is different from modes of production in which 
continuing relationships with employees and consumers are a precondition of 
competitive success. In the financial economy, fortunes are made by fractional 
deductions from massive capital flows - a few gain massively from small fractional 
charges levied on millions of pension-fund holders and the like. It is only as 
expectations of excessive reward have spread from city elites, to the entire cadre of 
chief executive officers, in private and public sectors alike, that the broader social 
consequences of the financial sector’s dominance are now seen. (The growing 
salience of gambling, in New Labour’s enthusiasm for the National Lottery and 
casinos, and in television gambling-shows, is one cultural symptom. Increasing 
income inequalities are another. 8) These disparities in incomes are legitimated by the 
necessities of global competition, but while there are international markets for the 
services of footballers or film stars, there are none for most executive posts in public 
or private sectors. These growing inequalities have little functional economic purpose. 
They are an abuse of corporate power.  
 
Britain’s imperial traditions, linked to the role of the city, have continued to be central 
to the self-definition of the British governing class, from Thatcher to Blair. It is no 
longer easy to defend imperial rule per se, so the assertion of global influence by 
military force is instead justified in the cause of human rights and democracy, and as 
part of the war against terrorism and ‘extremism’. These global ambitions are 
unsustainable for Britain in isolation from the United States, and thus the alliance with 
the Americans is seen as an unquestionable necessity. (More so, in fact, than it was 
under Wilson or Heath, when the project of ‘modernisation’ seem to point in more 
‘industrial’ and thus European directions.) The defence export industry, which Robin 
Cook sought to bring under some kind of ethical control, maintains its primacy in this 
continuing imperial project.  
 
The peculiar strength of the British state  
What has seemed paradoxical in the past twenty-five years has been the continuing 
dependence of Britain’s neo-liberal economic system on the exceptionally forceful 
exercise of central state power. Under Thatcher, this could be explained by the use of 
the state as a sledgehammer to subdue class collectivism. Without it, the corporate 
power of working class institutions could not have been defeated. But in the later 
years of Tory government, and under Blair, governmental power has been deployed 
not only for purposes of coercive control, but also in more ‘positive’ ways, to open up 
formerly public forms of production to private sector exploitation (through PFIs and 
the like), and to re-engineer public mentalities in a consumerist and individualised 
direction, via the machineries of targets, inspections, audit, and performance 
indicators. The justification of marketisating reforms in public services such as health 
and education is a demand for consumer choice which in fact barely exists. (Most 
citizens say they prefer good local services to the right to choose.) But once public 
services have been constructed as markets, there will be no way of relating to them 
other than as consumers. This is a project in which people are being forced to be free.  
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 Richard Wilkinson’s argument (The Impact of Inequality 2002) that inequality causes ill-
health suggests another large consequence of this situation. We can think of obesity and anti-
social behaviour as in part social illnesses brought about by social humiliation.  
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In spite of these government-driven moves towards a market society, there has been 
no diminution in the weight of the state (public expenditure has remained remarkably 
consistent as a share of gross national product), and this calls for explanation. Given 
their neo-liberal ideology, why have successive governments not brought Britain 
closer to the lower American level of public spending?   
Part of the explanation no doubt lies in the inertial power of the unusually centralised 
British state, accruing power to itself and its functionaries whenever opportunities 
allow. (France, Italy, Germany, Spain, the USA, Australia and Canada all have more 
devolved systems of government.) But one might also look for explanation to some 
functional requirements of the British capitalist system. For example, the social 
polarisation inherent in de-industrialisation and the dominance of the financial sector 
is a threat to social cohesion, sometimes manifested in actual disturbances. The state 
therefore becomes more forceful, adopting measures to reduce poverty and social 
exclusion, and to reinsert citizens into the labour market by sanctions and re-
education. It becomes afraid of social disorganisation as this is reflected in increasing 
crime and disorder (or the fear of these), and has been hyperactive in its policies of 
control, with exceptionally high rates of imprisonment, ASBOS, and toughenings-up 
of the criminal justice system. Thus the pursuit of individualism leads to demands for 
an ever-stronger state to contain its disintegrative effects. This is one aspect of the 
‘authoritarian populism’ earlier characterised by Stuart Hall.  
 
Another cause of the persistent strength of central government is the weakness of 
many sectors of British capital, which cannot be relied upon to maintain their 
competitive edge without the intervention of the state. Two of Britain’s few globally 
competitive industries, armaments (including aerospace) and pharmaceuticals, have 
enjoyed the support of government through defence procurement and the purchasing 
power of the NHS, and through the state funding of scientific research. Britain’s 
success in many ‘creative industries’ owes a lot to its universities and specialist 
educational institutions, in art, drama and music, and perhaps also to the BBC.  
 
Some sectors were bound to grow in an advanced economy, such as the human 
services of education, health and social care, hitherto located primarily in the public 
sector. In order to provide opportunities for private capital, governments decided to 
open them up for exploitation, usually against the resistance of both service-users and 
providers. In this sector there has therefore been both privatisation and increased 
government supervision. Similarly, quasi-monopoly providers of material goods and 
services such as transport and energy have been privatised, but their powers turned 
out to be so prone to abuse as to need recurrent intervention by the state.  
 
It seems too that the Labour Party and the trade unions, and the Labour electorate, 
have quietly exacted a price for sustaining Labour in office, for example in the shape 
of (eventual) investments in public services such as health and education, and in the 
enforcement of a minimum wage. Although the language of class conflict has 
virtually disappeared from the contemporary political vocabulary, the contradictions 
of class remain a significant latent presence in the British social system. However, 
whereas the role of the state until the 1970s was to maintain some kind of equilibrium 
between organised class forces, since the 1970s it has become  unambiguously  
identified with the interests of capital. As a result, New Labour has at some points 
enjoyed more business support than the Conservatives. The goal of the New Labour 
state is to sustain a viable market society, all aspirations for its eventual 
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transformation into a higher form of life having been expunged in the internal party 
reforms of the past two decades.  
 
The history of the last twenty-five years has shown the key importance of 
campaigning for democratic reform of the British state. Its nexus of finance, empire, 
and monarchy has provided sustained support for the neo-liberal revolution, and has 
served to disable resistance to market encroachment. The strength of the British 
state has made possible the new authoritarian class settlement, since the checks and 
balances that existed within the system were largely  informal, and could be 
disregarded by governments intent on imposing a new political and economic 
settlement. This highlights the continuing importance of the ‘democratisation’ 
agenda’ – though it perhaps also points to a serious obstacle to organic change.  
 
The Long Revolution today 
Where does this updated analysis leave us, in terms of the contemplation of political 
alternatives? How might reading Raymond Williams’s political writings guide us in 
the serious impasse in which the left now finds itself? 
 
Creativity and a whole way of life 
Williams told us that what is at stake in the arguments for socialism is the nature of a 
whole way of life, and human aspirations for experiences of self-determination, 
learning, and relationship, and not narrowly economic or political goals. He was able, 
in company with other writers of the New Left, to revitalise socialist thinking through 
drawing on a deeper register of meanings and understandings than came from 
conventional socialist discourse, whether Labourist, Fabian, or Leninist. Williams 
believed that the deepest understanding of a way of life was to be found in its 
imaginative explorations - in novels, plays, cultural criticism - rather than in its formal 
political writings, and this is what brought a wider audience to his writings. To 
fashion a critique of the current order, we need to return to his imaginative modes of 
understanding. 
 
For Williams, the attainment of material prosperity was an unqualified gain. He would 
have welcomed the fact that major regions of the former ‘third world’, such as China 
and India, are now making progress towards enhanced living standards. Although 
strongly committed to ecological responsibility, and critical of current versions of 
‘growth’, in Towards 2000 Williams rejected the idea that the poorest countries 
should be denied the possibility of industrialisation to meet their own needs. He 
argued for solutions to these problems in terms of global equity, and a redefinition of 
economic purpose. He believed that material prosperity should be a means to 
fulfilling, humanly connected lives, and not an end in itself. How can we imagine 
what these fulfilling lives might consist of, aside from material consumption? 
 
Williams’s conception of the core value of ‘creativity’ included dimensions of work, 
learning, and decision-making. A good life would be one in which work made use of 
human faculties; in which education would encourage the development of a variety of 
capacities; and where people would share in decision making in the public sphere. 
The socialist movement was the cradle for the advance of these ideas - in Williams’s 
view democracy itself would not have been achieved without working class agency, 
and the idea of creativity as a measure of the quality of labour gained its currency 
through socialist thinking. But it may be that these conceptions can no longer depend 
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on their historical incubator, and need to be thought of as aspirations relevant to all 
citizens equally.  
 
Democratic processes 
The political system, and its deficits, are fundamental to the facilitation or obstruction 
of such advances. Williams gave great emphasis to the limitations of the British 
constitutional system, and to its antipathy to democratic life. Without information, 
deliberation, and procedures for shared decision-making, there can be no progress. 
This is true at the level of workplace, locality, party, national government, and indeed 
internationally as writers on global democracy such as David Held have argued.  
 
Thus Williams’s insistence on the need for constitutional reforms remains valid. 
Proposals for a more democratic system, advanced by him and by Charter 88 - 
through local devolution, fixed-term parliaments, proportional representation, a 
representative second chamber, and greater power for both Houses of Parliament over 
the executive - are key to creating space for a more open political life. The symbiotic 
alliance between state and capital, now maintained by secretive negotiation and 
lobbying, can only be challenged if the central state is made to devolve some of its 
powers. In a more democratic and devolved state, different communities of interest 
and value would gain a stronger voice. New Labour’s initial promise on constitutional 
questions, advanced at first through devolution and the London Mayoralty, etc, has 
not been fulfilled. It now seems that in Britain, neo-liberalism and a strong centralised 
state now sustain each other, paradox as this may seem.  
 
The claims of democratic processes need to extend more widely than the formal 
constitutional system. Individuals need rights of consultation and participation in the 
workplace. As Williams pointed out, in the health and education services the rights of 
professional employees to share in the determination of working processes were once 
taken for granted, though these have now been reduced by managerialist reforms. 
Here there is some room for manoeuvre, even within the terrain of New Labour. I 
argued in Soundings 26 (Spring 2004) that procedures of audit and inspection could 
be re-configured to allow service-users, employees and local citizens to participate in 
the evaluation and improvement of public services, with the support of specialist 
advisers. The ‘stakeholder’ concept for the co-determination of corporations, 
advocated by Will Hutton as a means to a socially-responsible capitalism, should be 
part of a democratic programme. (Hutton thought that the governance system of 
British business in which only the interests of mobile shareholders had legal weight 
gave rise to a damaging ‘short-termism’ in corporate decision-making.) 
Unexpectedly, New Labour has given weight to a ‘stakeholder’ conception of 
collective ‘voice’ - against the grain of its customary preference for the right of 
customer ‘exit’ - in some parts of the reformed public sector, for example in the 
constitution of Foundational Trust hospitals. However these democratic initiatives 
take place in such a marketised climate that they will have an uphill struggle to make 
an impact.  
 
Communication, education and culture 
In the years since Williams wrote, conflicts have continued between the different 
forces and principles underlying communication systems. On the one hand, the power 
of commercial media corporations, such as News International, have grown, and the 
latter’s newspapers, together with the Daily Mail, has exercised a corrupting influence 
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on New Labour. The weakening of terrestrial television in competition with 
commercial satellite providers is having the effect of delivering up large audiences to 
programmes permeated by the ideology of global markets. International sportspersons 
have become standard- or logo- bearers for a way of life in which brands, celebrity, 
and millionaire rewards become the objects of desire, and sports clubs become the 
property of the corporate rich. A globalised system in which ‘winners take all’ means 
that everyone else has less.  
 
On the other hand, public service broadcasting has survived as a powerful institutional 
form, despite political threats to its autonomy and competition for its market-share, 
and continues to be held in high public regard. The growth of ever-larger reading 
publics, and committed audience communities of many kinds (for theatre, rock, art, 
music et al), as a consequence of extended education, greater resources, and indeed 
longer active life-spans, expands the social base for communication, which neither 
state nor corporations are able wholly to control. The growth of the Internet is a new 
and extraordinary force, offering enormous opportunities for citizens to inform 
themselves. This must be deemed an advance within any democratic conception of 
culture. And even though much of the time one is aware of the degrading role of 
commercial media on political life, there remain many competing national 
newspapers and television channels, and one cannot say that political leaders and their 
decisions in Britain are protected from criticism. The Blair government initially 
responded positively to the demand for more information, via the Freedom of 
Information Act and the use of the internet, though its ambivalence about this has 
become increasingly evident. The recent use of committees of inquiry to formulate 
policies (on Pensions, the Environment, Transport, Town Planning, etc) has been a 
step back in the right direction from ‘sofa government’, or what Williams described as 
the methods of a court, whatever one may think of the policies proposed in each case. 
In the field of communication and culture, in part because of the work of Williams 
and others in insisting that they are critical to an informed democracy, a vigorous 
struggle between different ideologies and systems continues unresolved.  
 
In education, to which Williams also attached great importance, the outcomes of 
development are also ambiguous. On the one hand, more citizens are being educated, 
for longer. On the other hand, educational systems are being remodelled in 
instrumental and behaviourist ways, giving priority to the needs of the labour market, 
and to the construction of individualist mentalities, over more intrinsic conceptions of 
educational purpose. Attention to relationships between teachers and learners, or 
delight in fields of study, are diminished by the pressures on schools and universities 
to compete, on criteria which often have little to do with authentic education. This is 
one area where Williams may have been perceptive in his forecast of twenty-five 
years of conflicts and setbacks. However these may yet not prevent an eventual 
progress towards cultural democracy.  
  
The sphere of care and the rise of human services 
A positive development in recent decades, anticipated by Williams, has been the 
emergence of care through the life-cycle as an expanding field of work, and as the 
focus of new kinds of understanding. This is partly a reflection of changing gender 
relations, following on women’s majority entry into education and paid work. Just as 
an earlier radical vocabulary drew on the actual experience of labour in fields, 
workshops, mines and schools, so a new vocabulary of emotional and relational needs 
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has been emerging from the experiences of families, hospitals, clinics, nurseries, and 
universities, enlarging understanding of the needs of bodies, minds and feelings.9 New 
Labour’s commitment to the goal of a universal child-care service could be a genuine 
new frontier for the welfare state (though see Priscilla Alderson’s article in this issue 
for a more critical take on New Labour’s policies towards children). The well-being 
of modern societies abundant in commodities depends on the quality of attention they 
give to people. This is a field where there have been genuine advances in theory and 
practice since The Long Revolution.  
 
The environment 
Environmental concerns are vital in themselves, for reasons of collective human self-
preservation, as Williams already recognised. But they also call into question the 
dominant values of consumer societies, which place acquisition and - as Williams 
wrote - its often ‘magical’ satisfactions10, as central to its way of life. The idea that we 
are part of a system which cannot be infinitely exploited, but which is subject to 
damage from our own activity, and that resources and objects need to be treated with 
care, rather than merely used up, is antithetical to consumption as the primary good. 
Modern ecological and pre-capitalist traditions of thought have in a common respect 
for time-scales longer than that of a single generation. The moral communities which 
form themselves around the goals of the protection of the environment - of species, 
topographies, places of historical value - which are now large and are unusually well-
sustained by the media - are civic associations which are transversal to both market 
and state. They are among many examples of value-based collectivities that need to be 
part of democratic deliberation. 
 
Alternatives to the present 
It has become more difficult in the last two decades than it was when Williams was 
writing, to see ours as merely one possible social system among others. ‘Actually 
existing capitalism’ seems now to hold us intellectually captive nearly as much as 
‘actually existing socialism’ did its people. Williams evoked ‘organic’ ways of 
thinking and feeling, as antitheses to the instrumentalism and individualism which 
characterised capitalism as a way of life. This was the significance of the ‘Culture and 
Society’ tradition in his thought. As someone deeply influenced by Marxism, and by 
collectivist working class movements, Williams saw capitalism to be a connected and 
dynamic system, and was not afraid to refer to it by its name.  
 
Thatcherism attacked many pre- or non-capitalist institutions and traditions in British 
society as well as the collectivism of the working class. She detested the ‘class 
compromise’ which she thought paternalist Tory and Whig traditions had made with 
socialism, and sought to sweep it away. Thatcher’s was a truly bourgeois revolution - 
a dictatorship of the bourgeoisie as Simon Jenkins has put it 11 - with small allegiance 
                                            
9
 The growing importance of human services to the definition of well-being has been a point of 
linkage between psychoanalytic thought and social issues. Raymond Williams rejected what 
he saw as the individualism of Freud’s view of human nature, though he also noted the 
radically social nature of his understanding of identity-formation in early family relationships 
and its potential. The development of psychoanalysis since Freud, especially in the ‘object 
relations’ ideas first formulated by Klein and others during the early years of the welfare state, 
has emphasised this ‘social’ conception, and made it a resource for progressive thought.  
10
 Raymond Williams ‘Advertising: the Magic System’, reprinted in Problems in Materialism 
and Culture (1980).  
11
 In Thatcher and Sons: A Revolution in Three Acts. (2006).  
 11
to any non-capitalist residues. This regime was insistent that ‘there could be no 
alternative’ to its own conception of the future.  
 
The West’s cold war victory and the collapse of Soviet Communism in 1989 gave 
force to this one-dimensional view. Hope for the redemption of the flawed socialist 
states, which Gorbachev’s reforms had inspired, disappeared; a system which could 
on occasion provide a counterweight to the dominant world order (in the role of the 
South African Communist Party for example) was ended; and there was a loss of 
interest in Marxist ideas.  
 
We can most valuably take from Raymond Williams the idea of a ‘whole way of life’ 
as potentially subject to continuous learning and remaking over time. His conception 
of socialism as universal human creativity and agency, based in co-operative and 
democratic social relationships, transcends its historical origin in the experience of 
industrial labour. The possibilities which Williams identified in The Long Revolution 
and in Towards 2000 remain valid starting points for the renewal of the socialist 
project today. 
 
 
-end-  
  
